

Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 JIDDA 05702 01 OF 05 050639Z
ACTION PM-05

INFO OCT-01 NEA-10 ISO-00 SAA-01 SES-02 OMB-01 CIAE-00
H-01 INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 SP-02
SS-15 ICA-11 ACDA-12 TRSE-00 AID-05 HA-05 EB-08
COME-00 DOE-15 SOE-02 EUR-12 /127 W
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P 050510Z JUL 78
FM AMEMBASSY JIDDA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2914
INFO USMTM DHAHRAN
SECDEF WASHDC
JCS WASHDC
USCINCEUR
CINCPAC HONOLULU
USCINCSO
CSA
CNO
CSAF
CMC
DISAM WP AFB OHIO

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 5 JIDDA 5702

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: MASS, MPOL, XX, SA
SUBJECT: INTEGRATED ASSESSMENT OF SECURITY ASSISTANCE--SAUDI
ARABIA

REF: (A) STATE 167901 (B) STATE 168320
(C) USCINCEUR 071545Z JUL 78 (D) USCINCEUR 101151Z JUL 78
(E) JIDDA 5149 (F) USCINCEUR 131635Z JUL 78

1.(A) SHORT DESCRIPTION OF U.S. INTERESTS TO BE SERVED BY
A SECURITY ASSISTANCE RELATIONSHIP:

(1) SAUDI ARABIA IS OF SIGNIFICANT IMPORTANCE TO THE
UNITED STATES BECAUSE OF ITS GEOGRAPHIC POSITION, IMMENSE
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PAGE 02 JIDDA 05702 01 OF 05 050639Z

OIL RESERVES, ECONOMIC STRENGTH, AND IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION.

(2) ASTRIDE THE MAJOR AIR AND SEA TRANSIT ROUTES BETWEEN
AFRICA/EUROPE AND SOUTH ASIA, SAUDI ARABIA OFFERS
SIGNIFICANT POTENTIAL FOR U.S. BASING AND OVERFLIGHT RIGHTS
WHICH ARE KEY TO A CONTINUED U.S. INFLUENCE IN THE
INDIAN OCEAN REGION.

(3) SAUDI ARABIA POSSESSES THE WORLD'S LARGEST KNOWN

PETROLEUM RESERVES WITH EXCESS PRODUCTION CAPACITY SUFFICIENT TO GIVE HER GREAT WEIGHT IN THE OPEC POLICY/ PRICING COUNCILS. THE RESULTANT HARD CURRENCY RESERVES GIVE SAUDI ARABIA THE CAPABILITY TO PROVIDE SUPPORT TO NEIGHBORING ARAB PENINSULA STATES AS WELL AS INFLUENCE ECONOMIES WORLD-WIDE. THE ECONOMIC STABILITY OF THE FREE WORLD DEPENDS ON CONTINUED ACCESS TO SAUDI OIL AND ON THE RECIRCULATION OF THE RESULTING PETRO DOLLARS. A STABLE SAUDI ARABIAN GOVERNMENT, FRIENDLY TO THE WESTERN WORLD AND THE U.S. IN PARTICULAR, IS NECESSARY TO INSURE THAT SAUDI ARABIA CONTINUES TO ACT AS A CONSTRUCTIVE RATHER THAN A DISRUPTIVE INFLUENCE ON THE WORLD ECONOMY.

(4) THE LEADERSHIP IN SAUDI ARABIA IS OPPOSED TO COMMUNISM AND ALL LEFTIST IDEOLOGIES. THROUGH FINANCIAL SUBSIDIES AND DIPLOMATIC INFLUENCE, SHE HAS BEEN A MODERATING INFLUENCE NOT ONLY ON HER ARAB NEIGHBORS BUT ALSO IN MANY AREAS OF AFRICA. SHE ALSO CONTINUES TO PLAY A KEY ROLE IN MODERATING OPEC PRICING POLICIES. SAUDI ARABIA HAS THUS CONTRIBUTED TO ACHIEVING THE U.S. GOALS OF INCREASING REGIONAL STABILITY AND LIMITED SOVIET INFLUENCE.

(B) STATEMENT OF SPECIFIC SECURITY ASSISTANCE OBJECTIVES:

(1) MAINTAIN SAUDI ARABIA'S ABILITY TO EXERCISE ITS MODERATING INFLUENCE IN THE MIDDLE EAST BY ENABLING HER TO DEFEND THE OIL RESOURCES WHICH ARE THE SOURCE OF HER POWER AND INCOME.

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SECRET

PAGE 03 JIDDA 05702 01 OF 05 050639Z

(2) ASSIST SAUDI ARABIA IN MODERNIZING AND DEVELOPING SELF-SUFFICIENCY IN HER MILITARY STRUCTURE TO THE POINT WHERE SHE CAN DEFEND HER TERRITORY AGAINST AN ATTACK BY HER NEIGHBORS.

(3) INSURE THE CONTINUED SUPPLY OF PETROLEUM.

(4) RESTRICT SOVIET INFLUENCE IN THE AREA BY MAINTAINING THE WESTERN ORIENTATION OF THE SAUDI ARMED FORCES.

(5) ASSIST SAUDI ARABIA IN ITS CONSTRUCTION OF PORT FACILITIES, CANTONMENT AREAS, AND OTHER MILITARY BUILDING PROJECTS ESSENTIAL TO DEVELOPMENT OF A VIABLE NATIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE.

(6) INCREASE SAUDI SUPPORT TO OTHER REGIONAL STATES.

(7) MAINTAIN A BALANCE BETWEEN THE DESIRES OF SAUDI MILITARY FOR THE LATEST HARDWARE AND THEIR CAPABILITY TO MAN AND MAINTAIN IT.

2. (A) STATEMENT OF THE THREAT, BOTH EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL. PERCEIVED BY THE HOST COUNTRY.

(1) INTERNAL. THE SAUDI ARABIAN GOVERNMENT IS CONSIDERED TO BE ONE OF THE MOST STABLE IN THE MIDDLE EAST. THE ORDERLY TRANSFER OF POWER AFTER KING FAISAL'S DEATH DEMONSTRATED THE ROYAL FAMILY'S ABILITY TO WORK TOGETHER AND TO

PRESENT A UNIFIED FRONT. ALTHOUGH A MONARCHY. THERE IS LITTLE EVIDENCE
OF DISCONTENT AMONG
THE PEOPLE; RATHER, THE CURRENT FIVE YEAR PLAN INSURES THAT
ECONOMIC BENEFITS FROM INCREASED OIL REVENUES ARE PASSED DOWN
TO SAUDI CITIZENS. THE GOVERNMENT IS ALERT TO THE DANGERS
OF INFLATIONARY PRESSURES AND HAS ACTED TO KEEP THEM UNDER CONTROL.

(2) EXTERNAL. WHILE THERE IS NO CLEAR INDICATION OF
POLITICAL INTENT, THE SOVIET EQUIPPED GROUND AND AIR FORCES
OF IRAQ ARE CAPABLE OF A QUICK DRIVE TO SEIZE THE SAUDI OIL
FIELDS AS A REPLACEMENT FOR HER OWN. RECENT EVENTS AND SOVIET
AND CUBAN ACTIVITIES IN THE HORN OF AFRICA, SOUTH YEMEN, AND
AFGHANISTAN HAVE LEAD TO GREATLY INCREASED SAUDI CONCERN
WITH REFERENCE TO SOVIET OR SOVIET-DOMINATED ENCIRCLEMENT
OF SAUDI ARABIA AND ITS OIL FIELDS. THE SAUDIS FEAR BOTH AN
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SECRET

PAGE 04 JIDDA 05702 01 OF 05 050639Z

OVERT MOVE INTO NORTH YEMEN AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF BASES
FROM WHICH SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITY COULD BE CONDUCTED. THESE FEARS
ARE BUTTRESSED BY THE HISTORICAL FLUCTUATION OF TERRITORIAL
BOUNDARIES ON THE ARABIAN PENINSULA AND RECURRING INCIDENTS
ALONG THE IRAQ-KUWAIT BORDER.
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PAGE 01 JIDDA 05702 02 OF 05 050724Z
ACTION PM-05

INFO OCT-01 NEA-10 ISO-00 SAA-01 SES-02 CIAE-00 H-01
INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 SP-02 SS-15
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CSA
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S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 5 JIDDA 5702

(B) HOST COUNTRY'S STRATEGIES TO MEET THREAT.

(1) DEVELOP THE MAXIMUM MILITARY CAPABILITY PERMITTED BY LIMITED MANPOWER AND EQUIPPED WITH WEAPONS WHICH MINIMIZE MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS.

(2) CULTIVATE A SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP WITH THE USG SO THAT THE U.S. ASSISTANCE WILL BE FORTHCOMING IN CASE OF NEED.

(3) SUPPORT FRIENDLY NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES IN ORDER TO PRECLUDE AND REDUCE SOVIET INFLUENCE IN THE AREA.

(4) INSURE THE MAXIMUM DISTRIBUTION OF THE BENEFITS OF OIL WEALTH TO ALL MEMBERS OF THE POPULATION.

3. STATEMENT OF THE MISSION'S PERCEPTION OF THE THREAT,

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 JIDDA 05702 02 OF 05 050724Z

IF IT DIFFERS FROM WHAT MISSION UNDERSTANDS TO BE THE HOST COUNTRY'S ESTIMATES: NO DIFFERENCE.

4. THE TYPE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT THE HOST COUNTRY BELIEVES SUITED TO MEET THE COUNTRY'S REQUIREMENTS AND THE THREAT: MANPOWER LIMITATIONS PRECLUDE A MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT SUITABLE TO MEET THE THREAT AND SAG IS AWARE OF THIS. SAG WILL CONTINUE TO DEPEND UPON EXTERNAL ASSISTANCE TO MEET THE THREAT.

WITHIN REALISTIC MANPOWER LIMITS, SAUDI ARABIAN GOV BELIEVES IT SHOULD HAVE A MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT CAPABLE OF DELAYING AN ENEMY FROM REACHING VITAL AREAS SUFFICIENTLY LONG SO THAT EXTERNAL ASSISTANCE CAN BE PROVIDED. TO MAXIMIZE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF LIMITED MANPOWER, THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT IS BEING EQUIPPED WITH THE MOST MODERN, LABOR SAVING WEAPONS, AND SAUDI PERSONNEL ARE BEING CONCENTRATED IN COMBAT AND SENSITIVE SUPPORT SYSTEMS. OTHER SUPPORT AND ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATIONS WILL BE OPERATED BY CONTRACT PERSONNEL UNTIL SUCH TIMES AS SUFFICIENT SAUDI MANPOWER IS AVAILABLE. WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE NATIONAL GUARD, THE COMPOSITION OF THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT ARE AS STATED IN PARAGRAPH 5 BELOW.

5. AN ASSESSMENT OF THE FORCE DESCRIBED ABOVE IN RELATION TO U.S. INTERESTS AND ALTERNATIVES:

(A) SAUDI ARABIA'S MILITARY FORCES WOULD BE ONLY A MINOR FACTOR IN ANOTHER MIDDLE EAST WAR DURING THE NEXT

SEVERAL YEARS. HER FORCES, HOWEVER, ARE RAPIDLY
MODERNIZING AND HAVE THE CAPABILITY TO DEPLOY TO KEY AREAS,
THUS SERVING AS A STABILIZING INFLUENCE IN THE REGION. THERE
IS INSUFFICIENT POPULATION TO SUPPORT ARMED FORCES LARGE ENOUGH
TO POSE ANY SUSTAINED OFFENSIVE THREAT TO THEIR NEIGHBORS, BUT
MODERNIZATION AND BETTER INTEGRATION OF AVAILABLE ASSETS
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SECRET

PAGE 03 JIDDA 05702 02 OF 05 050724Z

SHOULD PRODUCE A REASONABLE DEFENSIVE CAPABILITY.
COMMON TO ALL SERVICES IS THE LIMITED JOINT
COMMAND/MILITARY EFFORT. ALTHOUGH A JOINT
STRUCTURE HAS BEEN FORMED, THERE IS NO EFFECTIVE
NATIONAL COMMAND COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM TO PROVIDE DIRECTION
AND CONTROL TO THE VARIOUS SERVICE BRANCHES. AS A RESULT
JOINT OPERATIONS ARE MINIMAL. (B) SAUDI ARABIAN LAND FORCES
(SALF). THE SALF IS IN THE PROCESS OF MECHANIZING TWO OF
ITS FOUR INFANTRY BRIGADES. THE REMAINING TWO WILL BE MECH-
ANIZED AT A LATER DATE. MANPOWER CONSTRAINTS HAVE NOT
PRECLUDED THE CONVERSION OF THE FIRST TWO INFANTRY BRIGADES
TO MECH BRIGADES. HOWEVER, A FORESEEABLE PROBLEM IS THE
ACQUISITION OF PERSONNEL, TO FILL OUT THE TWO REMAINING
BRIGADES. PERSONNEL WILL BE COMING FROM ALREADY
UNDER-MANNED SUPPORT UNITS, THEREBY REDUCING THEIR COMBAT SUP-
PORT EFFECTIVENESS. THESE FOUR BRIGADES, COMBINED WITH AN
EXISTING BRIGADE OF FRENCH ARMOR AND AN EMBRYO AIRBORNE
BRIGADE WILL BE CAPABLE OF MAKING A SHOW OF FORCE IN
LOCALIZED CONFLICTS. IN ADDITION, THE SALF HAD CONDUCTED
TWO JOINT EXERCISES WITH THE RSAF DURING 1977. THE LIMITED
NUMBER AND SCOPE OF JOINT EXERCISES REFLECTS THE EMBRYONIC
DEVELOPMENT OF THIS TYPE COOPERATION. THE CONCEPT IS NEW TO THE
SAUDI ENVIRONMENT BUT IS BEING ENCOURAGED BY USMTM, AND THE
SAUDIS CAN APPRECIATE ITS VALUE. THE SALF AIR DEFENSE FORCES
HAVE EXCELLENT EQUIPMENT, BUT WILL HAVE TO BE INTEGRATED WITH
RSAF INTO A COUNTRY-WIDE AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM FOR MAXIMUM
EFFECTIVENESS.
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PAGE 01 JIDDA 05702 03 OF 05 050845Z
ACTION PM-05

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S E C R E T SECTION 3 OF 5 JIDDA 5702

(C) SAUDI ARABIAN NATIONAL GUARD (SANG). SANG HAS
MODERNIZED TWO BATTALIONS AND IS IN THE PROCESS OF MODERNIZING
A THIRD.

FIVE MORE BATTALIONS ARE EXPECTED TO BE MODERNIZED IN THE NEAR
FUTURE. THE BULK OF THE SANG FORCES, HOWEVER, CONTINUE
TO BE BEDOUIN TRIBESMEN WITH LITTLE CONCEPT OF MODERN WAR-
FARE, THUS WOULD BE OF LIMITED EFFECT. SANG FORCES WOULD
MOST LIKELY BE USED FOR HOLDING FIXED DEFENSIVE POSITIONS
FOR SHORT PERIODS OF TIME OR FOR HIT-AND-RUN HARASSMENT OF
AN INVADER'S FORCE.

(D) ROYAL SAUDI AIR FORCE (RSAF). EMPHASIS HAS BEEN PLACED
ON THE DEFENSIVE RATHER THAN THE OFFENSIVE POTENTIAL OF THE RSAF.
RSAF IS DEVELOPING AN EFFECTIVE POINT-DEFENSE FORCE AND IS
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SECRET

PAGE 02 JIDDA 05702 03 OF 05 050845Z

EMPHASIZING A UNIT-LEVEL MAINTENANCE PROGRAM IN ITS TRAINING.
RSAF C-130'S ARE ABLE TO SUPPORT LOCAL
CONTINGENCIES AS DEMONSTRATED BY THE WITHDRAWAL OF SAUDI
INFANTRY BRIGADES FROM SYRIA AND JORDAN IN THE FALL OF 1976.
THE RSAF F-5 CAPABILITY CONSIST OF AN OPERATIONALLY COMBAT
READY SQUADRON AT TAIF AND AN OPERATIONAL CONVERSION UNIT AT
DHAHRAN FOR F-5 PILOT TRAINING. A SECOND OPERATIONAL F-5
UNIT WAS ACTIVATED AT KHAMIS MUSHAYT IN OCTOBER 1977 WITH
A LIMITED OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY. THESE UNITS WILL BE AUGMENTED
BY F-15 SQUADRONS AT DHAHRAN, TAIF AND KHAMIS MUSHAYT UNDER THE
PEACE SUN PROGRAM. RSAF CANNOT SUPPORT ANY SUSTAINED OPERATIONS
WITHOUT EXTENSIVE CONTRACTOR ASSISTANCE.
(E) ROYAL SAUDI NAVAL FORCE (RSNF). THE BACKBONE OF RSNF

WILL BE 13 PATROL GUNBOATS WITH HARPOON MISSILES.
THEIS WILL GIVE RSNF A LIMITED PATROL AND INTERDICTION
CAPABILITY IN BOTH THE ARABIAN GULF AND THE RED SEA.
RSNF PERSONNEL LACK EXPERIENCE AND PRESENTLY CANNOT USE THE
EQUIPMENT TO ITS FULL CAPABILITIES.

6. BRIEF ANALYSIS OF DEFENSE SPENDING IN THE ECONOMY AS
A WHOLE: THE SAUDI 5-YEAR PLAN (1975-1980) HAS NOW BEEN
REVISED TO AN ESTIMATED COST OF \$200 BILLION. DEFENSE SPENDING
IS PLANNED FOR \$22.2 BILLION, 11 PERCENT OF THE TOTAL.
THE OTHER MAJOR CATEGORIES ARE ECONOMIC RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT,
\$26 BILLION, 13 PERCENT: HUMAN RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT,
\$22.7 BILLION, 11 PERCENT: SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT, \$9.4 BILLION,
4 PERCENT: PHYSICAL INFRASTRUCTURE CONSTRUCTION, \$32 BILLION,
QY PERCENT: ADMINISTRATION, \$10.8 BILLION, 5 PERCENT; AND EXTERNAL
ASSISTANCE, \$18 BILLION, 9 PERCENT. THEIR PROBLEMS IN EFFECTING
IMPROVEMENTS IN DEFENSE OR OTHER 5-YEAR PLAN CATEGORIES RELATED TO
MANAGEMENT TO ADMINISTER PROGRAMS,
OVERSEE RECEIPT AND MOVE-
MENT OF PURCHASES, AND INTEGRATE PURCHASE UNITS INTO
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SECRET

PAGE 03 JIDDA 05702 03 OF 05 050845Z

CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT: TRANSPORTATION TO INCLUDE
RECEIVING AND STORAGE AT AIR AND SEAPORTS, AND SHIPMENT OF
MATERIALS TO DESTINATION; AND THE PHYSICAL INFRASTRUCTURE TO
SUPPORT AND PROTECT PURCHASES. IN-COUNTRY SPENDING FOR
DEFENSE CONSTRUCTION AND CONTRACTOR SUPPORT DOES COMPETE FOR
LIMITED RESOURCES AND TENDS TO DRIVE PRICES UP. HOWEVER,
THE ADVERSE EFFECT ON THE ECONOMY CAUSED BY SPENDING FOR DEFENSE
IS NOT DISPROPORTIONATE TO THE EFFECT CAUSED BY SPENDING IN
THE OTHER MAJOR CATEGORIES. THE ADVERSE EFFECT IS DECREASING
AS RESOURCES ARE BECOMING MORE PLENTIFUL. ON THE OTHER HAND,
EXPENDITURES FOR DEFENSE POSITIVELY SUPPORT THE CIVILIAN SECTOR
WITHIN SAUDI ABABIA

THIS IS EVIDENCED PRIMARILY IN THE CONSTRUCTION OF RELATED
FACILITIES, SUCH AS HOUSING, SCHOOLS. AND HOSPITALS. THE
ESTABLISHMENT OF NEW MILITARY INSTALLATIONS IN PREVIOUSLY
UNINHABITED AREAS ATTRACTS CIVILIAN ENTERPRISE. ALSO THE
DEFENSE EFFORT ASSISTS IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF COMMERCE THROUGH
THE IMPROVEMENT AND BUILDING OF PORTS, ACTIVITY IN THE
MANUFACTURING AND MAINTENANCE SECTOR, AND USE OF COMMERCIAL
MEANS TO TRANSPORT MILITARY GOODS.

(A) DEFENSE EXPENDITURES:

(\$ MILLIONS)

.U.S. FMS	FY 80	FY 81	FY 82
U.S. FMS	3498.7	1627.3	2223.6
U.S. COMMERCIAL		432.2	362.9 341.2
OTHER	600.9	566.3	528.5
TOTAL	4530.9	2555.6	3093.3

(B) DEFENSE EXPENDITURES AS A PERCENTAGE OF BUDJET AND OF GNP:

FY 80 - 6 PERCENT OF GNP

FY 81 - 3.1 PERCENT OF GNP

FY 82 - 3.7 PERCENT OF GNP(C) MILITARY IMPORTS AS PERCENTAGE OF
TOTAL IMPORTS:

FY 80--18 PERCENT

FY 81--9 PERCENT

FY 82--12 PERCENT

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 04 JIDDA 05702 03 OF 05 050845Z

(D) ANY FOREIGN EXCHANGE OR DEBT SERVICING PROBLEMS:

NONE. GROSS REVENUES ACCRUE AT RATE OF APPROXIMATELY
\$100M/DAY.

7. PROJECTION OF DEFENSE ARTICLE AND SERVICES:

REFER TO FY 80-84 MSAP, SAUDI ARABIA, TABLE D-1:

SUBMITTED TO EUCOM VIA USMTM 1TR,24 NOV 77.

8. ASSESSMENT OF EACH ITEM PROJECTED:

(A) F-15 AIRCRAFT: TO REPLACE BRITISH LIGHTNING AIRCRAFT:

FOR AIR SUPERIORITY AND SUPPORT OF SALF.

(B) BELL 212 HELICOPTERS: TO IMPROVE RSAF SEARCH AND

RESCUE CAPABILITY; PURCHASE NOT CERTAIN.

(C) AIRCRAFT SUPPORT: F-5 COSTS DUE TO RECENT INCREASE IN

FMS CASE VAL: C-130 COSTS DUE TO TACAN RETROFIT:

OTHER SUPPORT COSTS ARE FOR CONCURRENT SPARE PARTS, SUPPORT
EQUIPMENT AND SPARE ENGINES.

(D) AIM-7F: INITIAL WRM COMPUTATION.

(E) AIM-9J: FOR AIR DEFENSE.

(F) AGM-65: FOR AIR SUPPORT OF SALF.

(G) DRAGON AT AND TOW AT MISSILES: INCORPORATED INTO

PLANNED MECHANIZATION OF TWO SALF BRIGADES; PROGRAM NOT DEFINITIZED.

(H) NAVAL MODERNIZATION: PURCHASE OF PGG AND PCG VESSELS

IN SUPPORT OF SAUDI NAVAL EXPANSION PROGRAM.

(I) GROUND MOBILITY VEHICLES (M548, M113A1, ET AL):

PURCHASES IN SUPPORT OF PLANNED MECHANIZATION OF TWO

SALF BRIGADES; PROGRAM NOT DEFINITIZED.

(J) WEAPONS (M60A1, M106A1, M125A1, M109A1B):

PURCHASES IN SUPPORT OF PLANNED MECHANIZATION OF TWO SALF BRIGADES.

(K) RSAF COMMAN AND CONTROL/AUTOMATIC DATA PROCESSING

(ADP): RSAF MAJOR COMMUNICATIONS ENHANCEMENT PROGRAM INVOLVING

MOBILE COMMUNICATIONS SQUADRON, ADP SUPPORT FOR RSAF, AND

IMPROVED AIR DEFENSE/AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL RADAR SYSTEM.

(L) SAAF ADMINISTRATIVE LOGISTICS NET: PURCHASES IN

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SECRET

PAGE 05 JIDDA 05702 03 OF 05 050845Z

SUPPORT OF PLANNED MECHANIZATION OT TWO SALF BRIGADES.

(M) AN/TSQ-73 AIR DEFENSE COMMAND, CONTROL, AND COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM: EQUIPMENT PORTION OF \$2.3B COMMERCIAL CONTRACT INCLUDING RADAR, TROPOSCATTER COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM, CONSTRUCTION AND AIR DEFENSE INTEGRATION EQUIPMENT.

(N)32-3-0 RADAR: EQUIPMENT PORTION OF \$2.3B COMMERCIAL CONTRACT; SEE (M) ABOVE.

(O) SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM: DERIVED FROM U.S. ARMY COMMUNICATIONS COMMAND CONCEPT PLAN FOR ALF: SAG INTENT TO PURCHASE THIS SYSTEM IS NOT FIRMLY INDICATED.

(P) RSNF COMMUNICATIONS: REMAINDER OF FMS CASE LAH.

(Q) MK 46 TORPEDOES: WEAPONS PURCHASE FOR SAUDI NAVAL EXPANSION PROGRAM.

(R) TK 105MM, 155MM AMMUNITION: PURCHASES IN SUPPORT OF PLANNED MECHANIZATION OF TWO SALT BRIGADES.

(S) F-5 LASER GUIDED BOMB (LGB) KITS: TO IMPROVE ACCURACY OF BOMBS IN SUPPORT OF SALT.

(T) SIMULATORS: RSAF PURCHASES FOR MAINTENANCE/IMPROVEMENT OF FLIGHT SKILLS FOR F-5, C-130, AND F-15 AIRCREWS.

(U) F-15 MAINTENANCE TRAINING SQUADRON: TO SUPPORT OPERATIONAL UPGRADING OF F-15 SUPPORT PERSONNEL.

(V) DEPOT FACILITIES AND ENGINEERING: RSAF REQUEST FOR FMS CASE TO SURVEY CENTRALIZED MAINTENANCE/SUPPLY DEPOT REQUIREMENTS.

(W) SAUDI ORDNANCE CORPS PROGRAM:EQUIPMENT PURCHASES BASED ON SAUDI ARABIAN ARMY ORDNANCE CORPS 5-YEAR BUDGET, PRORATED BASED ON PREVIOUS BUDGETS.

(X) SAUDI ORDNANCE CORPS PROGRAM: SUPPLY PURCHASES BASED ON SAAOC 5-YEAR BUDGET: PRORATED BASED ON PREVIOUS BUDGETS.

(Y) RSNF SUPPLIES: PURCHASES OF UNIFORMS.

(J) CONSTRUCTION PROGRAMS: CONSTRUCTION ACTIONS IN SUPPORT OF F-15 SQUADRONS AND MAINTENANCE/SUPPLY DEPOT, ADP AND AD/CAD PROGRAMS; F-15 AND C-130 SIMULATOR PROGRAMS, SOCP AND RSNF PROGRAMS.

(AA) SPECIAL ACTIVITIES: PROVISIONAL PLANNING BOARD FOR RSNF COORDINATION OF TECHNICAL AND DESIGN SERVICE MATTERS

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 06 JIDDA 05702 03 OF 05 050845Z

RELATING TO SHIP CHARACTERISTICS AND TURBINE CONFIGURATIONS FOR RSNF VESSELS: ALSO FOR RSNF LOGISTICS SUPPORT TEAM.

SECRET

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SECRET

PAGE 01 JIDDA 05702 04 OF 05 051052Z

ACTION PM-05

INFO OCT-01 NEA-10 ISO-00 SAA-01 SES-02 CIAE-00 H-01

INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 SP-02 SS-15

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S E C R E T SECTION 4 OF 5 JIDDA 5702

(BB) RSAF OPERATIONS AND MAINTENANCE: TRAINING MUNITIONS FOR AIR-TO-GROUND TRAINING OF 200 PILOTS/YEAR; SUPPLY SUPPORT; SUPPLY EQUIPMENT; J-85 ENGINE OVERHAUL; F-15 FOLLOW-UP ON SUPPORT AND STOCK LEVEL FUNDING; AB-212 AND C-130 FOLLOW-ON SUPPORT; TECHNICAL DATA AND PUBLICATIONS; AND FOLLOW-ON CONTRACT COSTS FOR PEACE HAWK (F-5), C-130, AGUSTA BELL AND BRITISH AIRCRAFT CORPORATION, AND F-5 SIMULATOR.

(CC) SOCP OPERATIONS AND MAINTENANCE: BASED ON 5-YEAR BUDGET AND PREVIOUSLY ASSIGNED MISSIONS.

(DD) SALF AND SANG OPERATIONS AND MAINTENANCE: BASED UPON USMTM STUDIES OF PROJECTED PROGRAMS.

(EE) RSNF OPERATIONS AND MAINTENANCE: ESTIMATE INCLUDES MOBILIZATION AND TRANSPORTATION COSTS, PAYROLL, BENEFITS, SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 JIDDA 05702 04 OF 05 051052Z

AND PROFIT; INCLUDES 2,000 CONTRACT PERSONNEL AND PROJECTED RSNF MANPOWER SHORTAGES.

(FF) TRAINING: PROJECTS TRAINING COSTS FOR RSAF, SOCP, SALF, AND RSNF PERSONNEL; MOBILE TRAINING TEAM AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE FIELD TEAM REQUIREMENTS FOR FY 80-82 HAVE NOT BEEN DEFINITIZED: PROJECTIONS INCLUDE F-15 PILOT TRAINING FOR 20 PERSONNEL, UPGRADE TRAINING OF 20 F-5 PILOTS TO THE F-15, AND TECHNICAL TRAINING, AND MARITIME ACADEMY TRAINING FOR RSNF PERSONNEL.

9. ASSESSMENT OF ECONOMIC IMPACT IF PROJECTED ARTICLES AND

SERVICES ARE REQUIRED: REFER TO PARAGRAPH 6, ABOVE.
DEFENSE PURCHASES OF ARTICLES AND SERVICES WILL NOT ADVERSELY IMPACT
ON PLANNED
EXPENDITURES WITHIN OTHER MAJOR CATEGORIES OF THE BUDGET.
THE INFLATIONARY IMPACT UPON SAUDI ARABIA CAUSED BY THE COMPE-
TITION FOR AVAILABLE RESOURCES AMONG ALL MAJOR
CATEGORIES OF BUDGET SPENDING IS BEING PUT UNDER CONTROL BY THE
SAUDI ARABIAN GOV. THE SAUDI ARABIAN GOV DECISIONS
TO DELAY PURCHASES OR INITIATIONS OF PROGRAMS FOR DEFENSE,
WHICH HAVE NOT BEEN MAJOR DEVIATIONS IN ANY RESPECT,
HAVE BEEN UNDERTAKEN IN RESPONSE TO SAUDI PERCEIVED MANPOWER
LIMITATIONS.

10. AMRS CONTROL IMPACT OF MAJOR PROPOSED WEAPONS SYSTEMS
SALES: THE RATIONALE PRESENTED IN THE CONGRESSIONAL
PRESENTATION DOCUMENT: SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM, FY 1979.
PP. 137 (SAUDI ARABIA) AND 402 (ANNEX B) REMAINS PER-
TINENT. WITH RESPECT TO THE F-15 SALE TO SAUDI ARABIA, THE
ARMS CONTROL IMPACT UPON THE PERSIAN GULF AND EASTERN MEDITER-
ANEAN NATIONS HAS BEEN DEBATED EXTENSIVELY, AND THE EXECUTIVE
POSITION IS CLEARLY DEFINED. TAKEN FROM THE OVERALL VIEW,
THE MODERNIZATION AND EXPANSION OF THE
SAUDI ARABIAN ARMED FORCES ARE DIRECTED TOWARD THE ACHIEVEMENT
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PAGE 03 JIDDA 05702 04 OF 05 051052Z

OF A VIABLE DEFENSIVE CAPABILITY, ONE WHICH IS PATENTLY
MODEST IN COMPARISON TO THE MILITARY CAPABILITIES OF OTHER
NATIONS IN THE AREA. THERE ARE JUST TOO FEW ABLE-BODIES
MEN IN THE POPULATION TO SUPPORT AN EXPANDING ECONOMY AND
SIMULTANEOUSLY POSE A SUSTAINED OFFENSIVE THREAT TO
NEIGHBORING NATIONS. SAUDI ARABIA DOES NOT HAVE COMPULSORY
MILITARY SERVICE, AND SAUDI LAW PROHIBITS NON-SAUDIS AND
WOMEN FROM SERVING IN THE MILITARY FORCES. FOR THE
FORESEEABLE FUTURE, THERE WILL CONTINUE TO BE A
REQUIREMENT FOR FOREIGNERS TO PROVIDE MANAGEMENT AND TECHNICAL
ASSISTANCE TO THE SAAF.

11. HUMAN RIGHTS: SEE ANNEX A, CONGRESSIONAL PRESENTATION
DOCUMENT.

12. SUMMARY OF ECONOMIC AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE FROM OTHER
SOURCES:

(A) ECONOMIC: NONE.

(B) MILITARY: SAUDI ARABIA PURCHASE MILITARY GOODS AND
SERVICES FROM A NUMBER OF SOURCES OTHER THAN USG.

(1) FRANCE. SALF IS ORGANIZING AND EQUIPPING AN
ARMORED BRIGADE WITH FRENCH ASSISTANCE AND IS EXPECTED TO
EQUIP A SECOND BRIGADE SIMILARLY. THUS FAR 310
AMX-30 TANKS AND 150 AMX-10 APC'S HAVE BEEN DELIVERED. AN
ESTIMATED 200 FRENCH PERSONNEL ARE IN SAUDI ARABIA ENGAGED
IN TRAINING AND SUPPORT.

(2) GREAT BRITAIN SUPPLIES MAINLY SERVICES AS FOLLOWS:

(A) BRITISH AIRCRAFT CORP PROVIDES ENGLISH LANGUAGE TRAINING FOR SOME RSAF PROGRAMS, STAFFS THE RSAF TECHNICAL SERVICES INSTITUTE IN DHAHRAN. AND CONDUCTS PRIMARY FLIGHT TRAINING AT THE KING FAISAL AIR ACADEMY.

(B) THERE ARE A VERY FEW (APPROXIMATELY 12) BRITISH ADVISORS WORKING WITH THE SAUDI ARABIAN NATIONAL GUARD.

(3) PAKISTAN. THERE ARE AN ESTIMATED 490 PAKISTANI MILITARY PERSONNEL WORKING AS INDIVIDUALS IN VARIOUS POSITIONS IN SALF AND RSAF. THEY WORK PRIMARILY IN ADMINISTRATIVE AND SUPPORT POSITIONS, FOR WHICH THERE ARE INSUFFICIENT

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PAGE 04 JIDDA 05702 04 OF 05 051052Z

SAUDIS WITH THE NECESSARY SKILLS.

13. SINCE SAUDI ARABIA HAS BEEN FOR SOME TIME ON A COMPLETELY CASH FMS BASIS, PARAGRAPHS 13A THRU E OF TASKING MESSAGE DO NOT APPLY. THE RESPONSE TO PARAGRAPH 13F IS PRESENTED BELOW. BECAUSE THE VARIOUS SAUDI ARABIAN MILITARY SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS ARE UNUSUALLY LARGE AND LONG-TERM THE RESPONSE BELOW APPLIES TO ALL THREE YEARS IN QUESTION (FY 80, 81, 82).

(A)GENERAL: PRESENT MAAG MANPOWER AUTHORIZATION IS 80 MILITARY PERSONNEL, 2 GS CIVILIANS, AND 10 THIRD COUNTRY CIVILIAN (TCC) EMPLOYEES. SIX OF THE POSITIONS (ONE BRIGADIER GENERAL AND FIVE COLONELS--ALL US ARMED FORCE OFFICERS) ARE FUNDED BY USG, WITH ALL COSTS FOR THE REMAINING POSITIONS FUNDED BY SAG. USMTM MUST JUSTIFY EACH POSITION TO SAG MINISTRY OF DEFENSE AND AVIATION AS WELL AS DOD. ADDITIONALLY, AUSTERE ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONS IMPACT UNFAVORABLY ON USMTM MANNING. MAJOR CONDITIONS ARE: UNCONTROLLABLE PHYSICAL SEPARATION AMONG USMTM HEADQUARTERS, THE AMERICAN EMBASSY, AND MODA (MINISTRY OF DEFENSE AND AVIATION); WIDELY DISPERSED OPERATING DETACHMENTS: IMPROVING BUT INADEQUATE ABILITY OF LOCAL ECONOMY TO SUPPORT MISSION AND ASSOCIATED PERSONNEL AT MINIMAL STANDARDS; AND DIFFICULTY IN DEALING WITH INEXPERIENCED, UNTRAINED SAUDI COUNTERPARTS.

(B) MINIMUM MANNING LEVEL: REGARDLESS OF THE DEFINITIONS AND CONDITIONS ATTACHED TO THE THREE PROGRAM LEVELS IN THE TASKING MESSAGE, USMTM IS PRESENTLY OPERATING AT THE MINIMUM MANNING LEVEL, BELOW WHICH LITTLE OR NO CONSTRUCTIVE CONTRIBUTION COULD BE MADE TOWARD FULFILLING TOTAL PROGRAM OBJECTIVES. THIS IS SO BECAUSE THE CURRENT PROGRAM OBJECTIVES WERE ESTABLISHED IN THE PAST (SPECIFICALLY BY THE 1974 DOD SURVEY OF SAUDI DEFENSE NEEDS); CONSEQUENTLY, THE PROGRAMS ESTABLISHED WERE MASSIVE AND LONG-TERM. ADDITIONALLY,

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PAGE 05 JIDDA 05702 04 OF 05 051052Z

AS STATED ABOVE, SAUDI ARABIAN PROGRAM OBJECTIVES WERE NECESSARILY DETERMINED MORE BY MANPOWER LIMITATIONS THAN BY VALID DEFENSE NEEDS. COMPLETE ACHIEVEMENT OF THESE OBJECTIVES IS ESSENTIAL TO PROVIDING EVEN A VERY MINIMAL DEFENSE CAPABILITY. USMTM IS NOW, AND WILL CONTINUE BEYOND FY 82 TO BE , IN THE PROCESS OF ADMINISTERING THE EXECUTIO OF THESE PROGRAMS. A BRIEF SUMMARY OF MAJOR PROGRAMS IS INSTRUCTIVE:

(1) SALF: MECHANIZATION OF THE FIRST TWO INFANTRY BRIGADES WITH MECHANIZATION OF REMAINING BRIGADES EXPECTED TO FOLLOW.

(2) ACHIEVEMENT OF PROGRAM OBJECTIVES FOR ONE SERVICE AT THE EXPENSE OF OTHER SERVICE PROGRAMS, CAUSING AN UNBALANCED OVERALL DEFENSE CAPABILITY.

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PAGE 01 JIDDA 05702 05 OF 05 051059Z
ACTION PM-05

INFO OCT-01 NEA-10 ISO-00 SAA-01 SES-02 CIAE-00 H-01
INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 SP-02 SS-15
ICA-11 OMB-01 ACDA-12 TRSE-00 AID-05 HA-05 EB-08
COME-00 DOE-15 SOE-02 EUR-12 /127 W
-----113641 051107Z /11

P 050510Z JUL 78
FM AMEMBASSY JIDDA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2918
INFO USMTM DHAHRAN
SECDEF WASHDC
JCS WASHDC
USCINCEUR
CINCPAC HONOLULU
USCINCSO
CSA
CNO
CSAF
CMC
DISAM WP AFB OHIO

S E C R E T SECTION 5 OF 5 JIDDA 5702

(3) POTENTIAL VIOLATION OF THE SPIRIT OF PUBLIC LAW
95-92 BY THE SUBTERFUGE OF KNOWINGLY PLACING PERSONNEL
WITH LONG-TERM MANAGEMENT FUNCTIONS ON SHORT-TERM

ASSISTANCE TEAMS, IN ORDER TO EXECUTE LONG-TERM PROGRAMS
AGREED TO BY THE USG.

(D) INTERMEDIATE MANNING LEVEL: SINCE USMTM IS ALREADY

OPERATING AT THE MINIMUM FIXED BY LAW, DISCUSSION OF
INCREASING USMTM STRENGTH TO AN INTERMEDIATE LEVEL, DEFINED
TO BE BETWEEN THE MINIMUM LEVEL AND THE CURRENT LEVEL, IS
NOT APPROPRIATE.

(E) CURRENT MANNING LEVEL: THE CURRENT LEVEL AND THE
MINIMUM LEVEL ARE IDENTICAL.

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PAGE 02 JIDDA 05702 05 OF 05 051059Z

(F) JUSTIFICATION FOR USMTM: THE IMPORTANCE OF
SAUDI ARABIA AND ITS PETROLEUM AND FINANCIAL RESOURCES TO THE
FREE WORLD ARE STATED ABOVE AND ARE WELL KNOWN. THE SAG IS
PRESENTLY DEEPLY COMMITTED TO MODERNIZING A MILITARY FORCE
RESTRICTED TO MODEST SIZE TO DEFEND ITS REOURCES, MAINLY
THROUGH USG-APPROVED PROGRAMS AND FMS-SUPPLIED MATERIALS
AND SERVICES. THESE PROGRAMS ARE PRESENTLY IN THE PLANNING
AND EXECUTION PHASES. THE SAG MINISTRY OF DEFENSE AND THE
SAUDI ARABIAN ARMED FORCES HAVE ONLY A RUDIMENTARY
MANAGEMENT CAPABILITY. WITHOUT THE MANAGEMENT CAPABILITY
OF THE USMTM THESE MAJOR PROGRAMS WOULD, TO SAY THE LEAST,
QUICKLY RUN INTO MAJOR DIFFICULTIES AND EXTENDED DELAYS,
THUS LEAVING SAUDI ARABIA VULNERABLE TO AN OPPORTUNISTIC,
AGGRESSIVE MOVE BY ONE OR MORE OF ITS LESS FORTUNATE NEIGHBORS.
THE JUSTIFICATION FOR USMTM LIES IN THE FACT THAT ITS ACTIVITIES
AS A WHOLE ARE ESSENTIAL TO ESTABLISHING A CREDIBLE DETERRENT
TO SUCH A MILITARY TAKEOVER BY A GOVERNMENT UNFRIENDLY TO THE
U.S.

(G) JUSTIFICATION FOR EACH MEMBER OF USMTM: AS NOTED ABOVE,
CURRENT USMTM MAAG-AUTHORIZED STRENGTH TOTALS NINETY-TWO
INDIVIDUALS. JUSTIFICATION FOR EACH POSITION WOULD REQUIRE
THAT MANY SUBPARAGRAPHS. JUSTIFICATION OF NUMBERS OF POSITIONS
GROUPED BY SIMILAR FUNCTION WOULD NOT BE
SIGNIFICANTLY SHORTER. LIMITED TIME AVAILABLE FOR
PREPARATION OF THIS REPORT PRECLUDES TRANSMISSION OF INDIVIDUAL
JUSTIFICATIONS BY MAIL. IN THE INTEREST OF EXPEDITION OF TIME,
RECOMMEND DETAILED JUSTIFICATION BE OBTAINED FROM FY 78-82
JMP, FILED WITH OJCS/J-5.

(H) PARAGRAPHS 13G THROUGH I OF TASKING MESSAGE ARE NOT
APPLICABLE TO SAUDI ARABIA.

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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01 jan 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: SECURITY, MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS, ANNUAL REPORTS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 05 jul 1978
Decaption Date: 01 jan 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 20 Mar 2014
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
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Drafter: n/a
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Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Expiration:
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Handling Restrictions: n/a
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Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 2110673
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: INTEGRATED ASSESSMENT OF SECURITY ASSISTANCE--SAUDI ARABIA
TAGS: MASS, MPOL, XX, SA
To: STATE
Type: TE
vdkgvwkey: odbc://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/0bf7fb7a-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
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